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The Health Professions Act prohibits any person from practising within South Africa any health profession the scope of which has been defined by the Minister, unless he or she is registered in terms of the Act in respect of such profession.1 3 Contravention of this provision amounts to an offencel 4 which is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve months, or both a fine and such imprisonment.15
The HPCSA is the statutory regulatory body responsible for exercising control over medical practitioners, dentists, psychologists, and certain categories of medical personnel, such as physiotherapists, radiographers, medi-cal technologists, optometrists, and emergency care personnel. Our courts have recognised that the HPCSA is in effect the sole repository of the power to decide what is ethical and what is unethical in medical practice. 16 The HPCSA is also acknowledged as:
[Truly a statutory custos morum of the medical profession, the guardian of the prestige, status and dignity of the profession and the public interest in so far as members of the public are affected by the conduct of members of the profession to whom they had stood in a professional relationship.
17
The HPCSA has wide powers under the Health Professions Act, and may, inter alia, perform the following actions: "render financial assistance to professional boards to enable them to perform their functions"; consider, after consultation with the relevant professional board, "any matter affecting the professions registrable with the [HPCSA]"; consistent with national health policy determined by the Minister, "make representations or take such action in connection therewith as the [HPCSAJ deems advisable"; "delegate to any committee or any person such of its powers as it may from time to time determine"; and "make rules on all matters which the [HPCSA] considers necessary or expedient in order that the objects of [the Health Professions] Act may be achieved."' 8 Importantly, the HPCSA is empowered to establish such committees as it may deem necessary,1 9 including disciplinary committees, and is obliged to establish ad hoc disciplinary appeal committees. 20 It may delegate to any committee such of its powers as it may from time to time determine, but is not divested of any power so delegated. 2 1 The HPCSA derives its income from registration, examination, annual, and any other fees, payable in terms of the Health Professions Act. 22 The HPCSA is further responsible for recommending to the Minister of Health the establishment of "a professional board with regard to any health profession in respect of which a register is kept in terms of [the Health Professions] Act." 23 The professional boards also have wide powers under the Act, inter alia, the removal and restoration of names to and from a register, and the suspension of a registered person from practising his or her profession pending the institution of a formal inquiry; the appointment of examiners and moderators, the conducting of examinations, and the granting of certificates; the approval of training schools; the considerations of any matter affecting any profession falling within the ambit of the professional board, and the making of representations or the taking of such action in connection therewith as the professional board deems advisable; and the recognition of local and foreign qualifications. 24 Professional boards have the "power to institute an inquiry into any complaint, charge or allegation of unprofessional conduct against practitioners registered under [the Health Professions] Act." 2 5 In practice, professional boards do not conduct such inquiries themselves, but appoint a professional conduct committee to do so. 26 The Act defines "unprofessional conduct" essentially as "improper or disgraceful or dishonourable or unworthy conduct." 27 On finding the practitioner guilty of such conduct, the committee may impose one or other of the following penalties:
(a) a caution or a reprimand or a reprimand and a caution; or (b) suspension for a specified period from practising or performing acts specially pertaining to his profession; or (c) removal of his or her name from the register;[ 28 ] or (d) a fine not exceeding R10 000; [29] or (e) a compulsory period of professional service as may be determined by the professional board; or (f) the payment of the costs of the proceedings or a restitution. 30 24. Id. § 15B.
Id. § 41.

26.
Id. Such a committee is appointed by a professional board by virtue of its powers under section 15(5)(f) of the Act read with the regulations published in Government Notice R979 of 13 August 1999. See also section 15(5)(fA), which has been inserted into the Act after the promulgation of the regulations.
27.
Id. § 1.
28. The effect of a suspension or removal from the register is that the person concerned is disqualified from carrying on his or her profession and that his or her registration certificate is deemed to be cancelled until the period of suspension has expired or until his or her name has been restored to the register by the professional board. Id. § 44. If an appeal is lodged against a penalty of erasure or suspension from practice, such penalty remains effective until the appeal is heard. Id. § 42(1A).
29.
If, on reasonable grounds, the professional board is of the opinion, upon investigation of the complaint, charge or allegation of unprofessional conduct against a registered practitioner, that it will impose a fine on conviction after an inquiry, the registered practitioner may be given the option of an admission of guilt and payment of such fine. Id. § 42(8) , (9).
Id. § 42(1)(a)-(f).
Any person who is aggrieved by a decision of the HPCSA, a professional board, or a disciplinary appeal committee, may appeal to the appropriate division of the High Court. 3 1 2. Medico-Ethical Codes of Conduct "Although courts of law are clearly not bound by medico-ethical codes of conduct and medical practices when determining liability for medical malpractice, the ethical precepts and prevailing practices of the medical profession will be an important consideration in ascertaining what constitutes medical malpractice." 32 There are several national and international medico-ethical codes of conduct that govern the conduct of doctors and the practice of medicine. In South Africa, the HPCSA must, "in consultation with a professional board, from time to time make rules specifying the acts or omissions in respect of which the professional board may take disciplinary steps." 33 These rules of conduct-the Ethical Rules of Conduct for Practitioners Registered Under the Health Professions Act 34 -constitute the most important national medico-ethical code of conduct. It is important to note, however, that the professional board's power of inquiry is not limited to acts or omissions specified in these rules. 35
Id. § 20(1).
32. Strauss, supra note 1, at 40-41; see also CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 264.
Health Professions Act § 49(1).
34. Proc R717 in GG29079 of 4 Aug. 2006. We do not intend to discuss in detail the rules of conduct, but merely wish to mention the categories of rules currently pertaining to doctors and dentists in general. These categories are the following: advertising and canvassing or touting; information to be included on professional stationery; the naming of a practice; itinerant practice; fees and commission; partnership and juristic persons; covering; supersession; impeding a patient from obtaining the opinion of another practitioner or from being treated by another practitioner; casting reflections on the professional reputation of colleagues; professional confidentiality; retention of human organs; the signing of official documents; certificates and reports and the information they should contain; issuing of prescriptions; professional appointments; secret remedies; defeating or obstructing the council or board in the performance of its duties; performance of professional acts; exploitation; medicine; financial interest in hospitals; reporting of impairment or of unprofessional, illegal or unethical conduct; research, development and use of chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities; and dual registration. Another medicoethical code of conduct worth mentioning is the guidelines on ethics for medical research of the South African Medical Research Council (MRC). The MRC guidelines-the last complete edition of which was the third revised edition, published in 1993-are currently being reviewed. The following five booklets have thus far been published: BOOK 1: GUIDELINES ON ETHICS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH:
Reporting of Medical Errors and Adverse Events to the Health Profession Council of South Africa
Under the Ethical Rules of Conduct for Practitioners Registered Under the Health Professions Act, 36 a student, intern or practitioner is obliged to "report any unprofessional, illegal or unethical conduct on the part of another student, intern or practitioner." 37 Of course, prevention is better than finding a cure, and, to this end, the Rules provide that a student, intern, or practitioner must "report impairment in another student, intern or practitioner to the board if he or she is convinced that such student, intern or practitioner is impaired," 38 and must:
[R]eport his or her own impairment or suspected impairment to the board concerned if he or she is aware of his or her own impairment or has been publicly informed, or has been seriously advised by a colleague to act appropriately to obtain help in view of an alleged or established impairment. 3 9 "Impairment" is defined in the rules to mean "a mental or physical condition which affects the competence, attitude, judgment or performance of professional acts by a registered practitioner."
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B. Liability Systems
The relationship between doctor or hospital and patient is essentially governed by private law, and, to be more precise, the law of contract and the law of delict (tort). 4 1 However, public-law considerations are growing in importance in the wake of the introduction of the 1996 Constitution and national legislation. The majority of the South African population depends on the public sector for health care. 42 36. Proc R717 in GG29079 of 4 Aug. 2006. 37. Id. R. 25 (1)(c). Neither "unprofessional conduct" nor "unethical conduct" is defined for the purposes of these rules. It is submitted that, since a practitioner is required under Rule 21 to "perform, except in an emergency, only a professional act (a) for which he or she is adequately educated, trained and sufficiently experienced; or (b) under improper conditions and in appropriate surroundings," id. R. 21, conduct in contravention of Rule 21 will be regarded as unethical conduct that should be reported to the professional board. 
Contract43
A patient who consults a doctor in private practice enters into a contractual relationship with the doctor, and a patient who presents for medical treatment at a hospital enters into a contractual relationship with the relevant (private or provincial) hospital authority. In the latter instance, both the hospital authority and the staff of the hospital (including the doctors) may incur liability for the negligent conduct of the hospital employees. 44 No legal formalities are required for the conclusion of the contract between doctor or hospital and patient. The contract comes into being by mere consensus between the parties,4 5 but, in practice, both private and state hospitals usually require their patients to sign an admission form and require written consent for surgery. The contract may be concluded expressly or tacitly, and may be written or oral.4 6 Doctors in private practice normally enter into tacit agreements with their patients.47
Express agreements between doctor or hospital and patient are not unusual, especially in cases of specialised procedures. Where no express agreement has been reached, the implied terms of the contract between the parties will depend upon the specific circumstances of the case. 48 Usually, the implied agreement between doctor and patient entails that the doctor undertakes to examine the patient, to diagnose his or her ailment, and to treat the patient with such professional skill, competence, and judgment as the average or ordinary medical practitioner in the particular branch of the profession possesses, and with the amount of care that may reasonably be expected from such a practitioner.4 9 The doctor ordinarily undertakes to act in accordance with the recognised, accepted, customary, or usual practices of medicine. 50 Any unusual procedures contemplated by the medical practitioner should first be discussed with the patient. Ordinarily, by taking on a case, a doctor or hospital does not guarantee that the patient will be cured or that the intervention will be a success; of course, the possibility of an express or implied warranty to that effect does exist. 5 1 In the normal course of events, the doctor undertakes no more than to treat or operate upon the patient with due competence, care, and skillnamely, that which may be expected from a medical practitioner in the particular branch of the profession.
See generally CARSTENS
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A doctor or hospital that fails to perform in accordance with, or that departs or deviates from, the express or implied terms of the contract, commits a breach of contract. 5 3 Since medical practitioners are expected to exercise reasonable skill and care, it will amount to breach of contract for a medical practitioner to perform his or her duties in a negligent manner.
54
Breach of contract may result in the doctor or hospital being held liable for patrimonial loss, or in the doctor or hospital being unable to recover a fee for services rendered. 5 5 However, non-pecuniary (nonpatrimonial) damages cannot be recovered in contract. 56 Specific performance is not a likely remedy, since the doctor renders a personal service to the patient. The medical practitioner cannot unilaterally withdraw from the agreement once treatment has commenced. 58 Once the treatment has been completed, the agreement comes to an end and the doctor can no longer be involve medical examinations for non-therapeutic interventions (such as cosmetic surgery, experimentation, or prophylactic measures) or medical examinations for other purposes such as employment. expected to attend to the patient. 59 An undertaking on the part of a doctor to examine a patient and to diagnose his or her condition does not amount to an undertaking on the part of the doctor to personally treat the patient. 6 0 A doctor may refer the patient to another doctor for treatment without fear of being held liable for breach of contract. 61 In fact, a failure to refer a patient to a specialist when the doctor lacks the necessary knowledge or skill to treat the patient may amount to negligence. In terms of the law of delict, doctors and hospitals are expected to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm from occurring to their patients. 64 Should a patient suffer damage or loss as a result of a doctor or hospital's wrongful failure to take reasonable care, the doctor or hospital may incur liability for negligence. 65 A doctor or hospital that intentionally violates the patient's physical integrity may be held liable for assault, whilst a doctor or hospital that intentionally violates the patient's privacy may incur liability for injuria.
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The State Liability Act makes provision for delictual liability of the state. 6 7 Vicarious liability of the state is recognised in that a delictual claim against the state shall be cognisable by a court of law if the claim arises out of any wrong committed by any servant of the state acting in his capacity and within the scope of his authority as such. 68 
Criminal Law 70
The relationship between doctor or hospital and patient is not governed directly by criminal law. However, there are various common-law crimes that the doctor may conceivably commit in the course of practising medicine, including murder, 7 1 culpable homicide, 72 assault, 73 criminal defamation, 74 crimen iniuria, 75 fraud, 76 perjury, 77 and contempt of court. 78 Culpable homicide-which in South African law is defined as the negligent and unlawful causing of the death of another human being 79 -is by far the most relevant of these. In South African law, the conduct of a doctor who intentionally contributes to, or causes the death of, a patient, amounts to murder. Active euthanasia is therefore regarded as murder. 80 Because culpable homicide is the only common-law crime for which the proof of negligence (as opposed to intention) is sufficient, it is the only common-law crime for which a professionally negligent practitioner can be held liable. 8 73. Id at 455 ("Assault consists in any unlawful and intentional act or omission (a) which results in another person's bodily integrity being directly or indirectly impaired, or (b) which inspires a belief in another person that such impairment of her bodily integrity is immediately to take place.").
74. Id. at 475 ("Criminal defamation consists in the unlawful and intentional publication of matter concerning another which tends seriously to injure his reputation.").
75. Id. at 469 ("Crimen iniuria consists in the unlawful, intentional and serious violation of the dignity or privacy of another.").
76. Id. at 531 ("Fraud is the unlawful and intentional making of a misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another.").
77. Id at 343 ("Perjury consists in the unlawful and intentional making of a false statement in the course of a judicial proceeding by a person who has taken the oath or made an affirmation before, or who has been admonished by, somebody competent to administer or accept the oath, affirmation or admonition.").
78. Id. at 325 ("Contempt of court consists in unlawfully and intentionally (a) violating the dignity, repute or authority of a judicial body or a judicial officer in his judicial capacity; or (b) publishing information or comment concerning a pending judicial proceeding which has the tendency to influence the outcome of the proceeding or to interfere with the administration of justice in that proceeding."). The relationship between doctor or hospital and patient is ordinarily of a contractual nature. 9 5 Where no contract is formed between the parties, 96 the relationship between them is governed by the law of delict. 97 However, the same act or omission by a doctor or hospital may result in both contractual and delictual liability since a breach of a duty of care and negligence may constitute both breach of contract and a delict. 98 A breach of contract or the commission of a delict by a doctor may, in addition, result in criminal liability where the doctor's wrongful conduct 84 satisfies the requirements of the definition of a common-law crime. 99 Common-law crimes that may overlap with a breach of contract or the commission of a delict by the doctor include murder, culpable homicide, assault, criminal defamation, crimen injuria, and fraud. 100
C. Compensation Systems
No social insurance system for medical malpractice or adverse medical events exists in South Africa. There is also no compensation scheme for criminally caused injuries. Those wishing to recover from private practitioners or institutions have no alternative but to institute proceedings either in contract or delict in a court of law. Most of these cases will be settled out of court. 101 Those wishing to recover from a state institution, whether in contract or delict, can do so in terms of the State Liability Act. 102 This might be more difficult than one would imagine. In Nyathi v. MEC for Department of Health, Gauteng, 103 the applicant sought confirmation by the Constitutional Court' 04 of a declaration by the High Court that the provisions in section 3 of the State Liability Act that "[n]o execution, attachment or like process shall be issued against a defendant or respondent in any such action or proceedings or against the property of the State" 0 5 was unconstitutional and invalid.1 0 6 The salient facts of this case are indeed very disconcerting. On August 1, 2002, "the applicant suffered 30% second-and third-degree bum wounds after a paraffin stove was thrown at him." 1 0 7 He was admitted to the Pretoria Academic Hospital for treatment on the same day. 106. The constitutional validity of the provision was challenged "on the basis that it violated, inter alia, the rights to equality and dignity, enshrined in [sections] 9 and 10 of the two hospitals, the applicant suffered a stroke and severe left hemiplegia which left him in need of full-time care and medical treatment." He "used to receive a social grant of R570 per month and his wife's total monthly income was R1600."ll 2 The two of them "had to support their four children and provide for their daily living expenses."ll 3 On July 25, 2005-almost three years later-the applicant instituted an action in the High Court against the Member of the Executive Council for Department of Health (MEC), "claiming damages in the sum of R1,496,000 for the pain caused by the stroke and disability suffered as a result of the negligent and improper care he received at the two hospitals.""1 4 After initially resisting the applicant's claim, the MEC later admitted liability.1 15 "The only remaining issue was the amount payable to the applicant."
1 16 More than a year later, on July 27, 2006, "the applicant's attorneys wrote to the State Attorney stating that the applicant's health was deteriorating rapidly," that he "urgently required treatment and medication," and that he "could not afford to pay the necessary medical and legal costs while the hearing scheduled for [May 23, 2007,] was pending.""1 7
They requested that an interim payment of R317,700 be made within fourteen days, failing which they would approach the court for relief.1 18 On August 3, 2006, the State Attorney reported that it had referred the matter to the MEC and that the MEC had asked for one week within which to pay. 119 Twenty days later, the State Attorney advised the applicant's attorneys that the MEC was taking issue with paying the requested amount as an interim payment instead of a final payment.1 20 The MEC "requested that payment be deferred until the trial court had decided the issue of costs."' 2 1 "In September 2006, having received no further response from the [MEC], the applicant lodged an application in terms of Uniform Rule 34A," which provides for an application for an interim payment, 12 2 "and 122. UNIFORM RULES OF COURT, R. 34A(1) ("In an action for damages for personal injuries or the death of a person, the plaintiff may, at any time after the expiry of the period for the delivery of the notice of intention to defend, apply to the court for an order requiring the defendant to make an interim served it on the State Attorney during October 2006."123 "The matter was unopposed and the court ordered the [MEC] to make an interim payment to the applicant in the amount of 317,700 and to pay the applicant's costs on the attorney and client scale."l 24 On December 1, 2006, "[t]he applicant, having received no payment, sent a copy of the court order together with a letter to the State Attorney," stating "that should the first respondent fail to comply with the court order within the prescribed 30-day period, the applicant's attorneys would proceed with an application to compel him to do so."
1 25 The MEC failed to comply with the court order.1 26 The Constitutional Court confirmed the order of constitutional invalidity of the court a quo and suspended the declaration of invalidity for a period of twelve months to enable Parliament to pass legislation providing for the effective enforcement of court orders. 127 The court held that section 3 unjustifiably differentiated between the state and private judgment debtors. 12 8 It did not afford a judgment creditor who had secured judgment against the state the same protection and benefit afforded to a judgment creditor who had secured judgment against a private litigant. 129 Furthermore, section 3 placed the state above the law, as it did not positively oblige the state to comply with court orders.1 30 The Court further held that section 3 violated the constitutional rights to dignityl3' and access to courts. 132 Having found that the limitation imposed on these rights by section 3 was not reasonable and justifiable as intended in the Constitution's limitation clause, 133 the court proceeded to assess the effectiveness of the existing procedures to secure the satisfaction of judgment debts, which it considered essential in determining whether section 3 was constitutionally compliant.1 34 The existing provisions designed to assist judgment creditors in claiming from the National Revenue Fund and the Provincial Revenue payment in respect of his claim for medical costs and loss of income arising from his physical disability or the death of a person.").
123. Fundl 35 did not contain sufficiently accessible and simple procedures for the payment of judgment debts. Therefore, they did not constitute a reasonable fulfillment of the state's constitutional obligations and failed to deal with how court orders were to be satisfied.' 36 In his judgment, Justice Madala (for the majority) remarked that "deliberate non-compliance with or disobedience of a court order by the State detracts from the 'dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts."' 1 37
He also pointed out that "[t]he applicant was made to wait for an extremely long time for money required to pay for his treatment" without which "he stood a very slim chance of survival." 38 Although " [t] he State was made fully aware of this very desperate situation, [it] provided no relief," which showed a lack of "recognition for his worth and importance as a human being."l 39 "Having waited for many months, the applicant eventually received interim payment" once he approached the Constitutional Court, but he "only lived a short while thereafter." 40 Justice Madala added that "[r]eliance on the State's goodwill and moral standards has in this case proved to be futile."
In his review of the response of our courts to section 3, Justice Madala made the following pronouncements:
An assessment of the cases that have dealt with the Act and the liability of the State for its negligent actions have revealed that courts have been facing immense challenges in this area of the law. The various High Courts have approached the matter very differently and with disparate consequences. However, the common denominator is that judicial officers have recognised that there is a serious problem caused by the fact that a judgment creditor who obtains an order sounding in money, may find that order unenforceable against the State.
In more recent years, and in particular the period from 2002 onwards, courts have been inundated with situations where court orders have been flouted by State functionaries, who, on being handed such court orders, have given very flimsy excuses which in the end only point to their dilatoriness. The public officials seem not to understand the integral role that they play in our constitutional State, as the right of access 135. Id 
Sufficient Insurance Cover To Be Required for Private Health Establishments
Once section 46 of the National Health Act comes into operation, it will require every private health establishment to maintain insurance cover sufficient to indemnify a user for damages that he or she might suffer as a consequence of a wrongful act by any member of its staff or by any of its employees.1 44 In the terminology of the Act, "user" means a patient or certain other parties such as a minor patient's parent, or in the case of a person who is incapable of taking decisions, his or her spouse or partner, adult siblings, and other specified persons. 145 "Health establishment" is defined in the Act as "the whole or part of a public or private institution, facility, building or place, whether for profit or not, that is operated or designed to provide inpatient or outpatient treatment, diagnostic or therapeutic interventions, nursing, rehabilitative, palliative, convalescent, preventative or other health services." 1 46 This definition is drafted in such wide terms that it includes also the practice of private practitioners. Although most private hospital networks do have professional indemnity insurance, once section 46 of the Act comes into operation, it will become mandatory, and failure to comply will hold the risk of criminal sanction. Hospitals will therefore be responsible for maintaining sufficient insurance cover for staff, such as nurses, whereas medical practitioners attending to 
Id
patients at the hospital will be responsible for their own insurance cover as they are independent contractors.
Private Indemnity (Medical Protection Society)
More than 26,000 medical practitioners in South Africa belong to the Medical Protection Society (MPS).1 47 The organisation has been in South Africa for over fifty years.1 48 There are various differences between the medical indemnity offered by an organisation such as the MPS, and that offered by commercial insurers: 14 9 The MPS is a not-for-profit mutual organisation offering discretionary indemnity to their members (even in unusual circumstances).
5 0 The MPS offers unlimited cover for legal problems arising from medical practice,151 whereas commercial insurers will usually provide limited cover only. The MPS will not deny cover in respect of activities involving a contravention of the provisions of criminal law, 152 whereas the fine print of a commercial insurance policy may do just that. The MPS provides cover even where the medical practitioner's membership has lapsed, provided the membership dues were paid up at the time of the incidence which led to the claim,1 53 whereas commercial insurers may make cover conditional upon the policy still being valid at the time the medical practitioner issued. The MPS further provides legal advice and representation to members in a wide range of circumstances, including legal representation and advice from specialists in the field of medical litigation, and assist member to resolve specific ethical and medico-legal dilemmas as they arise in their practice. 
D. Relationships Among the Compensation Systems, the Liability Systems, and the Regulatory Systems
The Inquests Act provides for all matters pertaining to the holding of an inquest following the death (or suspected death) of a person from what is believed to be a cause other than a natural one. 155 In the medical malpractice context, the Act plays an important role in the initiation of criminal proceedings for culpable homicide or murder against a medical practitioner who has caused the death of a patient in a negligent or intentional manner. The Inquests Act provides that any person who has reason to believe that any other person has died due to other than natural causes must report this to a policeman.1 56 The Health Professions Act provides that the death of a person undergoing a therapeutic, diagnostic, or palliative procedure, or the death of a person as a result of such a procedure, shall not be deemed to be a death from natural causes as contemplated in the Inquests Act. 15 7 The same applies if any aspect of such a procedure has been a contributory cause of the person's death. 158 The effect of this provision is that an inquest must be held following such a death before a death certificate can be issued. A policeman who has reason to believe that any person has died from other than natural causes must investigate or cause to be investigated the circumstances of the death and report the death to the magistrate of the district concerned.1 59 The policeman investigating the circumstances of the death must submit a report thereon, together with all relevant statements, documents, and information, to the public prosecutor. 160 If Criminal proceedings are not instituted in connection with the death, the public prosecutor must submit those statements, documents, and information submitted to him to the magistrate of the district concerned.161 If on the information submitted to him it appears to the magistrate that the death was not due to natural causes, he must ensure that an inquest as to the circumstances and cause of the death is held by a judicial officer.1 62 Importantly, if the judicial 155. Inquests Act 58 of 1959 § 2(1). 156. Id. § 2. In view of the focus of this enquiry, no attempt shall be made to set out the relevant sections of the Inquests Act in detail. The provisions of the Act that may have a bearing on inquests to be held following an unnatural death at the hands of a medical practitioner will be set out and only to the extent strictly relevant to the present study. officer who held the inquest finds that the death was brought about by any act or omission prima facie involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person, he must cause the record of the proceedings to be submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions within whose area of jurisdiction the inquest was held.1 63 When the record of any inquest that has been submitted 64 to an Director of Public Prosecutions is no longer required by such Director of Public Prosecutions, it must be returned to the magistrate of the district in which the inquest was held.1 65 In terms of section 19(2) of the Inquests Act, such record is deemed to form part of the records of the magistrate's court of the district wherein the inquest was held.1 66 The provisions of the Inquests Act do not prevent the institution of criminal proceedings against any person in connection with any death, whether or not an inquest has commenced in respect of such death.1 67 Where a registered practitioner has, either before or after registration, been convicted of any offence by a court of law, the professional board is empowered to institute an inquiry if it is of the opinion that such offence constitutes unprofessional conduct.1 6 8 Such practitioner is liable upon conviction of one or other of the penalties mentioned in section 42 of the Health Professions Act. 169 In terms of section 45(1), however, before the imposition of any penalty, such practitioner must be afforded the opportunity of tendering an explanation to the council in extenuation of the conduct in question.1 70 The court that has convicted a registered practitioner of an offence must, where there appears to be prima facie proof of unprofessional conduct, direct that a copy of the record of its proceedings be transmitted to the professional board.171
Health Professions Act
In Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige & Tandheelkundige Raad v. Strauss, it was held that, notwithstanding the use of the words "before the imposition of any penalty" in the proviso of section 45(1), the accused doctor should, after proof of his or her conviction in a court of law, be afforded the opportunity to put his or her defence to the charge of unprofessional conduct.1 72 The court reasoned that "a strictly literal interpretation of section 45(1) would lead to a disciplinary inquiry being eroded to the point where it amounted to a farce wherein the disciplinary committee merely fulfilled the function of a rubber stamp," which would offend the principles of natural justice and fairness and would be "diametrically opposed to and incompatible with the obvious intention of the Legislature." 73 The obligation to direct that a copy of the record of its proceedings be transmitted to the relevant professional board is not restricted to a court that has convicted a registered practitioner of an offence. In fact, " [w] henever in the course of any proceedings before any court of law it appears to the court that there is prima facie proof of unprofessional conduct on the part of a registered person," or of conduct which, when regard is had to such person's profession, is unprofessional, the court is bound to "direct that a copy of the record of such proceedings, or such portion thereof as is material to the issue, be transmitted to the [relevant] professional board."' 74 It appears, therefore, that any civil and criminal proceeding is covered.
II. THE DETAILS OF THE APPLICABLE LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
A. Criteria Defining Qualification for Compensation
Liability Based on Fault
In South Africa, liability for professional medical negligence, in its civil law context, is primarily rooted in the Law of Obligations (translating into the Law of Contract and the Law of Delict (Tort)). As a result, it is trite law that all compensation for medical negligence (inclusive of medical error and any adverse event) is based on fault (in the form of culpa). Thus, generally speaking, a physician's negligence is legally assessed with reference to the yardstick of the "reasonable expert in the same circumstances." In any given context, negligence means that the defendant or the accused failed to foresee the possibility of harm (bodily or mental injury or death) occurring to another in circumstances where the reasonable person (diligens paterfamilias) in the defendant's or accused's position would have foreseen the possibility of harm occurring to another and would have taken steps to avoid or prevent it. The generic test for negligence is thus one of foreseeability and preventability. 175 Although the test for negligence is fundamentally objective, it does contain subjective elements when the neg-173. Id. at 205. doctor is a human being and not a machine and that no human being is infallible.182 In essence, "the standard of medical negligence is the recognized and accepted practices of the medical profession, provided these are not unreasonable and dangerous." 8 3 The test of medical negligence is the same in civil cases as in criminal cases.1 84 Medical practice is affected by many statutory provisions, as well as the common law, and many actions of a doctor that may result in civil liability or a disciplinary inquiry may also involve a contravention of criminal law. A prime example is medical negligence that results in the death of a patient and would constitute the criminal offence of culpable homicide.
Health Professions Act § 45(2).
See generally CARSTENS
The standard of care and skill, in context of medical negligence, required of a general practitioner is to be distinguished from the standard of care and skill required of a medical specialist. Simply stated, if the physician is a general medical practitioner, the test is that of the reasonable general practitioner.1 8 5 If the physician is a specialist, the test is that of the reasonable specialist with reference to the specific field of medical specialization.1 86
The Role of the South African Constitution, 1996
The common law pertaining to medical negligence is now subject to the supremacy of the South African Constitution of 1996. The Constitution, with its strong socio-economic rights base in terms of which everyone has access to health care services (including reproductive health carel 87 ), has catapulted health care into the public arena. 188 specific reference to the law of contract and delict. Universal access to health care and the notion of the public good, in context of the values, spirit, and purpose of the Constitution, as well as the reality that the majority of South African citizens are dependent on public health care, in the absence of a national health insurance system, have now had the effect that public health care has, to a certain extent, usurped private health care. This effect would also influence the understanding and application of the law pertaining to medical negligence and in some instances calls for a development or "reconfiguration" of the common law in step with the provisions of the Constitution.1 89
Nature of Damages and Compensation
In terms of the Law of Obligations (Contract and Delict) the same medical negligence (negligent act or omission) may constitute both a breach of contract and delict. In such a case of concurrence of actions, the patient-plaintiff can rely on the breach of contract or alternatively on delict. If he or she establishes both claims, damages should be awarded on the basis of the most advantageous claim. The patient-plaintiff may rely on both a breach of contract and delict in the same proceeding. In the case of such cumulative pleading, it is understood that the patient-plaintiff cannot recover more than the actual loss he or she has suffered. At the same time, if both claims are proved, the patient-plaintiff should be awarded damages on the basis of the cause of action most advantageous to him or her. Only pecuniary (patrimonial damages) may be recovered in contract, while pecuniary and non-pecuniary (non-patrimonial) damages can be recovered in delict. Recoverable pecuniary damages include medical costs (past as well as future), loss of income (past and future earnings), maintenance, etc. The ambit for recoverable non-pecuniary damages include not only compensation for actual physical pain, but also shock, discomfort and mental suffering, disfigurement, loss of amenities of life and disability, and loss of expectation of life-conveniently called loss for "pain and suffering which embraces all these non-pecuniary misfortunes, past and future." 90 It is possible to claim for detectable psychiatric injury, provided that there was actual psychological injury caused by medical negligence and the psychological harm is significant.191 Pecuniary loss and non-pecuniary loss is simply a matter of proof on a preponderance of probabilities and in most instances the services of actuaries are called in to quantify/calculate the pecuniary loss suffered by the patient-plaintiff, taking into account the inflation rate (in terms of loss of future earnings), depreciation, life expectancy, retirement age, etc. The calculation of non-pecuniary damages is more complex and controversial and in this regard courts are in principle guided by policy considerations and comparable precedent.1 92 Patient-plaintiffs usually recover damages jointly and severally in the event of medical negligence claims against more than one defendant doctor or hospital, and provision is made in the Apportionment of Damages Act for instances of contributory negligence. 193 There has also developed a tendency for defendants (doctors/hospitals) against whom a medical negligence claim was successfully instituted by a patient-plaintiff to institute action against one another for a re-apportionment of damages in terms of the Act, 194 specifically if the doctor/hospital-defendants are aggrieved by the apportionment of damages and the amount awarded to the patientplaintiff.
The most powerful deterrent against medical negligence litigation in South Africa is the risk that the patient-plaintiff runs of an order of costs being made against him if his case fails. The general rule in our system is that the loser pays the costs-his own legal costs as well as the taxed costs of his opponent on the so-called "party and party" scale. 195. In South Africa a so-called "contingency fee" is conditionally allowed since 1999 in terms of section 2 of the Contingency Fees Act, which reads as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law, a legal practitioner may, if in his or her opinion there are reasonable prospects that his or her client may be successful in any proceedings, enter into an agreement with such client in which it is agreed-(a) that the legal practitioner shall not be entitled to any fees for services rendered in respect of such proceedings unless such client is successful in such proceedings to the extent set out in such agreement; (b) that the legal practitioner shall be entitled to fees equal to or, subject to subsection (2), higher than his or her normal fees, set out in such agreement, for any such services rendered, if such client is successful in such proceedings to the extent set out in such agreement. (2) Any fees referred to in subsection (1) (b) which are higher than the normal fees of the legal practitioner concerned (hereinafter referred to as the 'success fee'), shall not exceed such normal fees by more than 100 per cent: Provided that, in the case of claims sounding in money, the total of any such success fee payable by the client to the legal practitioner, shall not exceed 25 percent of the total amount awarded or any amount obtained by the client in consequence of the proceedings concerned, which amount shall not, for purposes of calculating such excess, include any costs.
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[Vol 86:3 therefore constitutes a powerful incentive for settlement of cases out of court, depending on the merit and quantum of the case. Punitive damages (as known in the United States) are not awarded in cases of medical negligence in South Africa. 196 B. Causation and "Loss of Chance"
General Rules on Causation
In Muller v. Mutual and Federal Insurance Co. Ltd ., the court observed:
[T]he problem of causation in delict involves two distinct enquiries. The first is whether the defendant's wrongful act was a cause of the plaintiff's loss ("factual causation"); the second is whether the wrongful act is linked sufficiently closely to the loss for legal liability to ensue ("legal causation" or remoteness).
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In Minister ofPolice v. Skosana, the court observed that: Causation in the law of delict gives rise to two ... distinct problems. The first is a factual one and relates to the question of whether the negligent act or omission in question caused or materially contributed to the harm giving rise to the claim. If it did not, then no legal liability can arise and caedit quaestio. If it did, then the second problem becomes relevant, viz. whether the negligent act or omission is linked to the harm sufficiently closely or directly for legal liability to ensue or whether, as it is said, the harm is too remote. This is basically a juridical problem in which considerations of legal policy may play a part.
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Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 § 2. It should, however, be noted that it is a practice rule with the General Council of the Bar of South Africa, that member advocates are only allowed to enter into contingency fee agreements with clients claiming for personal injury with prior permission from the Bar Council. A cause is a necessary antecedent: in a very real and practical sense, the term embraces all things which have so far contributed to the result that without them it would not have occurred. It covers not only positive acts and active physical forces, but also pre-existing passive conditions which have played a material part in bringing about the event. In particular it covers the defendant's omissions as well as his acts.
Cf Collins v. Adm'r, Cape
Id. at 35 (quoting W.L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 237 (1971)). The judge then observed:
The test is thus whether but for the negligent act or omission of the defendant the event giving rise to the harm in question would have occurred. This test is otherwise known as that of the causa (conditio) sine qua non and I agree with my Brother VILJOEN that generally speaking Therefore the test for factual causation is, except in the most unusual of circumstances, the causa (conditio) sine qua non. The plaintiff must show that the harm would not have arisen but for the actions or omissions of the defendant. The courts decide the question of legal causation on the basis of a number of factors that relate essentially to public policy. The importance of public policy in the constitutional legal order prevails in South Africa. Public policy is informed by the values and principles of the Constitution. Thus decisions as to legal causation must also be informed by constitutional values and principles.1 99 The potential for convergence of the principles of the law of contract and of delict is evident from the judgment in Silver v. Premier, Gauteng Provincial Government, where the court refused to distinguish between the test for causation in considering the contractual as opposed to the delictual claim of the patient. 200 This is particularly relevant in the context of claims involving health care services since the facts upon which the claim is based, whether in contract or in delict, are likely to be the same in many instances.
(there may be exceptions) no act, condition or omission can be regarded as a cause in fact unless it passes this test. I am aware that the plaintiffs claim is founded in contract and, in the alternative, in delict. But I see no reason why the sine qua non test should not apply equally to the contractual claim in cAsu. The loss sustained by the plaintiff is said to have been caused by the breach of an implied term of an agreement that the hospital through its staff and employees would exercise due care, skill and diligence in providing nursing care. Precisely the same facts are relied upon as constituting a breach of the implied term as are relied upon as constituting a breach of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff. It would be anomalous if the same result did not follow irrespective of the cause of action. Furthermore, although the question of remoteness of damage for breach of contract is approached (in the absence of a contractual stipulation as to the basis on which compensation is to be made) by determining whether the damage flowed naturally and directly from the defendant's breach or is such a loss as the parties contemplated might occur as a result of such breach, it must, in my view, follow as a matter of logic that as a general rule, the test for factual causation would first have to be satisfied. There will, of course, be exceptions, such as that cited by [P.J.] Visser and [J.M.] Potgieter in Law of Damages (1993) para 6.3.2 at 80--l: '(W)here a building contractor X is not able to build because Y, who has to deliver cement, and Z, who has to supply bricks, both fail to honour their contractual obligations on the same day and thus cause damage to X (eg he loses profit). According to the conditio sine qua non 'test,' neither Y nor Z has caused damage since, if the breach of contract of each is notionally eliminated, the damage does not fall away!' The learned authors express the view that common sense must be employed in such cases Apart from an excellent monograph written by Van den Heever on the application of the doctrine of a loss of chance in medical negligence cases, 201 there is presently no reported judgments on the subject (in context of medical negligence actions) in South Africa, and the positive law position therefore remains uncertain. 202 An assessment of the application of the doctrine of loss of a chance in medical negligence underscores the difficulties often encountered by courts when adjudicating on causation in medical negligence in the face of multiple causation theories. Although reasons for and against the application of the doctrine have been persuasively argued and canvassed, 203 in general it seems as though factors militating against the application of the doctrine in medical law include the possibility of opening the floodgates for speculative claims, the idea of "playing god" by placing a value to human life, and the danger of an increase of the incidence of the practice of defensive medicine. On the other hand, factors or considerations that substantiate the application of the doctrine in medical law include the recognition of "a chance" having calculable value, the erosion of a patient-plaintiff's autonomy, considerations of fairness to a patient-plaintiff who is saddled with a difficult burden of proof, and general deterrence. 204 Whether South African courts, in context of medical negligence, will be prepared to apply the doctrine of a loss of a chance is doubtful, but at least a moot point, specifically if reliance is placed on comparable English law. In all probability resistance by the courts to apply the doctrine will ultimately emanate from policy considerations. 
C. Liability for Failure to Obtain Informed Consent
Van Oosten has extensively discussed the legal liability that may be incurred for no disclosure of information at all, for insufficient disclosure, and for excessive disclosure. 20 6 In this regard he states that:
The legal consequences of a medical intervention performed without the patient's effective consent are that the doctor/hospital may incur liability for breach of contract, [ 207 ] [t] his applies irrespective of whether or not the intervention was administered with due care and skill and eventually proves to have been beneficial to the patient." 2 13 Van Oosten further opines that the violation perpetrated by a doctor who performs the wrongful or unlawful operation is one against the patient's physical integrity or dignity/privacy rather than one against his or her health. 2 14 This view accords with the applicable provisions of the Constitution. As proposed elsewhere, the absence of informed consent should be seen in context of the Constitution as an infringement of one's right to bodily integrity as contemplated in terms of section 12(2)(b). 2 15
The onus of proving non-disclosure liability rests with the patient or the state, depending upon whether it is a civil action or a criminal prosecution. 2 16 Once a prima facie case of non-disclosure has been established, the doctor will have to refute the allegation of non-disclosure by adducing evidence that the requisite disclosure has indeed taken place. 2 17 Van Oosten opines in this regard that since disclosure documents and consent forms cannot serve as a meaningful substitute for a disclosure conversation, the former should be afforded evidential value, but should not be considered as conclusive evidence that the requisite disclosure in fact occurred. 2 18
D. Matters ofProof and Gathering ofEvidence
Matters of Proof
a. General
The onus of establishing civil liability for medical negligence on the doctor's part lies with the patient in a civil case and the prosecution in a criminal case. In a civil case liability must be established on a preponderance of probabilities. In a criminal case the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
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215. See CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 676. 216. In this regard Van Oosten states that, in the unlikely event of a doctor being charged with culpable homicide or sued for damages for causing the death of the patient by non-disclosure, it will not only have to be proved that the non-disclosure unlawfully or wrongly caused the patient's death, but also that it was reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances. VAN OOSTEN, supra note 206, at 455 n.83.
217. See STRAUSS, supra note 51, at 281. 218. VAN Oldwage v. Louwrens [2004] I All SA 532 (C). Note that, should the plaintiff be unable to prove his/her case on a preponderance of probabilities, judgment will be given in favour of the defendant; a court may, however, also order absolution from the instance. In delict, the plaintiff bears the onus to prove a wrongful act/omission on the part of the physician, as well as the element of fault (in the form of negligence) and that the act or omission caused him to suffer damages or personal injury. See HOFFMANN & ZEFFERTT, supra, at 496; SCHMIDT, In proceedings before an Inquest Court, the presiding magistrate has to make a finding on a preponderance of probabilities, 220 and in disciplinary proceedings before a disciplinary committee of the HPCSA, the pro formasupra, at 39; Matthews v. Young 1922 AD 492; Botha v. Van Niekerk 1947 (1) SA 699 (T). Where a defendant raises a special defence such as consent, contributory negligence, or prescription, the onus of proof will be on the defendant. See HOFFMANN At the inquest, conducted by a magistrate or a judge, the presiding officer will have before him/her the post mortem report and other documentation relevant to the death of the patient. Normally the pathologist/doctor who conducted the post mortem examination will be subpoenaed to testify at the inquest. In terms of § 16(2) of the Inquests Act, the presiding officer has the duty to make the following findings: a) the identity of the deceased; b) the cause or likely cause of death; c) the date of death; d) whether the death has been caused by an act or omission on the part of someone that prima facie constitutes an offence-the only relevant offence here in context of medical negligence is culpable homicide. At the end of the inquest an assessment has to be made whether on the evidence as a whole, all the elements for this crime, on a preponderance of probabilities are present. Clearly the findings in terms of the said section 16(2)(b) and (d) are paramount with reference to a possible criminal prosecution against a doctor. In this respect the post mortem examination and the report of the pathologist are vital. If the presiding officer makes a positive finding in respect of section 16(2)(d) he or she is obliged to submit the inquest record to the Director of Public Prosecutions who will then as a matter of course normally decide to institute criminal prosecution. In addition, a copy of the inquest record is submitted to the Registrar of the HPCSA to assess whether disciplinary proceedings on account of unprofessional con- [Vol 86:3complainant has to prove the charges of unprofessional conduct against the respondent-medical practitioner on a preponderance of probabilities. 22 1 It is to be noted, by way of a summary, that generally the application of the maxim of res ipsa loquitur is treated by the courts as a particular form of inferential reasoning, requiring careful scrutiny and giving rise to an inference of negligence rather than a presumption of negligence. 222 The South African courts thus far have been reluctant to apply the maxim to cases of medical negligence. Recent case law, however, suggests that the maxim could only be invoked where the medical negligence alleged depends on absolutes and the evidence shows that a particular result would not have followed but for the alleged negligence. 223 Persuasive arguments have been put forward that the maxim should be applied in specific circum-stances with regard to the proof of medical negligence. 224 In this respect, general principles for the effective application of the maxim in cases of medical negligence are advanced, inter alia, that principles of procedural equality and constitutional considerations dictate that the maxim be applied in cases of medical negligence.
As a general rule of evidence, a plaintiff in a medical negligence action is required to present expert medical evidence in support of allegations thereof. In this regard, expert medical evidence is pivotal in support or defence of medical negligence. 2 25 The South African Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Michael v. Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd. had the opportunity to enunciate the general applicable considerations in assessing expert medical evidence. 226
b. Gathering ofEvidence
For the purpose of gathering evidence pertaining to medical negligence, there are different rules which may be invoked to obtain such evidence, depending on the forum in which the doctor's or hospital's negligence is adjudicated. In a criminal trial and in inquest proceedings, the doctor may request certain sections (documents like sworn statements) from the police docket and may also request further particulars for purposes of trial. 227 At disciplinary hearings against a doctor before the Professional Board of the Health Professions Council of South Africa on a charge of professional misconduct (inclusive of alleged medical negligence), the defendant-doctor (respondent) is also entitled to further particulars to the 225. Plaintiffs often find it difficult to obtain medical experts who are prepared to testify against their colleagues. This resistance is described in the literature as a "conspiracy of silence," a term coined [i]n your own enlightened self-interest, break this conspiracy before the public does it for you!"). Although there is a greater willingness amongst medical practitioners to testify against fellow practitioners, specifically in cases of gross negligence, it seems that it is still problematic for plaintiffs to readily acquire the services of medical experts in this regard. charge, as well as the initial letter of complaint of the patient originally lodged with the Registrar, and the findings of the prelim committee who assessed the prima facie merits of the case against the doctor. 228 In the context of civil litigation, patient-plaintiffs may invoke the Promotion of Access to Information Act, to obtain access to medical records and other related information. 229 The Act was introduced " [t] o give effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held by the State and any information held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights." 230 It should, however, be noted that the Act does not apply to medical records and related medical information requested for civil proceedings after the commencement of the proceedings. 23 1 Where legal proceedings in a medical negligence action have commenced, there is a strict discovery procedure to be followed for the production and discovery of expert medical reports, and similar documents (inclusive of a pretrial conference) as prescribed, inter alia, by the Rules of the Supreme Court Act. 232 
III. AVAILABLE EMPIRICAL DATA ON MEDICAL ERRORS AND ADVERSE EVENTS, THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO PREVENT AND/OR REDRESS SUCH ERRORS AND EVENTS, AND THE PREVALENCE AND
IMPACT OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE MEDICAL ERRORS AND ADVERSE EVENTS, IMPROVE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE, OR REDUCE SYSTEM COSTS Obtaining empirical data on medical negligence in South Africa has proved very difficult. Despite numerous phone calls and e-mails to officials in the National Department of Health, the various Provincial Departments of Health, the National Department of Justice, the Health Professions Council of South Africa, and the Medical Protection Society, not a single piece of empirical data was provided by any of these parties. Web-sites for the most part do not provide up-to-date, detailed information. This left the authors out in the cold, turning to media reports for answers. It has been reported, for instance, that "[n]early 2,000 doctors in public and private the organisation as a whole, and remarked that " [t] he worst of the adverse claims experience has been in the UK and South Africa, although we are beginning to see a rise in both the frequency and average size of claims in most countries in which we operate around the world." 24 7 He expressed major concern about the "quite startling increase in the value of high claims in the UK, where some settlements have leapt by 40% or more as compared with similar claims settled in the recent past," and remarked that "a similar worrying trend is also beginning to emerge in South Africa." 24 8 The MPS promotes safer practice by running risk management and education programmes to reduce avoidable harms. 249 A confidential counselling service for members was introduced in South Africa in 2009, and has reportedly been very favourably received by members. 250 Medico-legal consultants are available round-the-clock to help members with legal and ethical dilemmas arising from their professional practice, clinical negligence claims, complaints, disciplinary procedures, police investigations, regulatory inquiries, inquests, and the like.
"Most claims relate to botched cosmetic surgery, children born with brain damage, birth defects not diagnosed timeously and Caesarean sections not done when needed." 25 1 It should be noted that South African law recognises actions for wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth, but not wrongful life. Not surprisingly, the subscription rate for specialists doing obstetrics and gynaecology tops the list at R130,540 for the year January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2010.252 Plastic and reconstructive surgeons fall in the "very high risk" category with a corresponding subscription rate.
Claims worth more than Rim account for over 18% of the total number. 253 This amounts to an increase of nearly 550% in ten years. Claims for amounts above R5m have increased nine fold in the past decade. 254 According to media reports, statistics from the Health Professions Council of South Africa show that the names of forty-four medical practitioners have been removed from the register since 2005 as a result of having been found guilty of unprofessional conduct. 256 Between April 2008 and March 2009, approximately ninety medical practitioners were found guilty of unprofessional conduct. 257 The conduct complained of included insufficient care, refusing to treat patients, misdiagnosis, practising outside the particular practitioner's scope of competence, overcharging, and charging for services not rendered. 258 Between January 2008 and October 2008, forty-seven practitioners were found guilty of unprofessional conduct relating to substandard service or inadequate treatment. 259 
IV. ATTITUDES AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
The medical malpractice and compensation scenario in South Africa cannot be properly understood without an insight into the broader socioeconomic and, specifically, healthcare situation in the country. South Africa is a developing nation, with pockets of highly developed infrastructure and highly trained and skilled people. "Health care varies from the most basic primary services provided by the State for free" to the indigent, "to highly specialised hi-tech services available in both the public and private sectors." 260 The total population in South Africa is in the order of 49 million. "The private sector spends about R66-billion to service 7-million people" through private medical insurance. 26 1 This sector also provides services "to foreigners looking for top-quality surgical procedures at relatively affordable prices." 262 The public sector spends about R59 billion on the rest of the population. 263 This amounts to 3.05% of the GDP. 264 We are still reaping the consequences thereof. Currently, there is a National Strategic Plan in place to address challenges posed by HIV/AIDS with increased expenditure. One of the biggest challenges facing the South African system of liability and compensation for medical malpractice is the shortage of qualified health care practitioners. "Doctors and nurses carry a very heavy workload because of vacancies, an increase in the number of patients coming for treatment and lack of resources." 27 1 The chairman of the South African Medical Association, Norman Mabasa, said that the current incidence of medical malpractice is the result of "the skills shortage in the public health system." 2 72 Exhaustion is common. 273 Mabasa has said that " [j] that "doctors in provincial hospitals worked under trying conditions." 275 "Analysis of figures for registered doctors in relation to the general population and international standards," based on 2004 figures, "indicates that South Africa is substantially better supplied with doctors than its immediate neighbors, but grossly undersupplied when compared to many developed countries." 276 South Africa had a rate of 7.7 medical practitioners per 10,000 population, whilst Austria, for instance, had a rate of thirty-five, and Canada a rate of twenty-one. 27 7 Vast amounts of money are spent to educate health care workers who are lost to developed nations as a result of recruitment. In 2001, there were almost 1,500 South African doctors in Canada; 17% of all doctors in Saskatchewan earned their first medical degree in South Africa.
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The president of the South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, Ronald Bobroff, attributes the high number of negligence cases in the private and state sectors to a lack of accountability and poor management. 279 Ambulance services, for instance, do not always respond timeously, resulting in lawsuits. 2 80 This is attributed to poor management and the use of unsuitable vehicles. 2 81 Health Minister Dr. Aaron Motsoaledi is reported to have said that the amount paid out in lawsuits was unacceptable. 282 Motsoaledi has told Parliament's portfolio committee on health that he planned to commission an investigation into the reasons for the increase in litigation and the state of care in public hospitals. 283 The Nyathi case illustrates how difficult it can be, especially for the indigent, to successfully claim damages from, and enforce judgment against, the state. 284 Poorer members of the community not only face the higher risks associated with an understaffed and underresourced public health sector, but also the hurdle of high legal costs. 
